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Abstract
Despite the spectacular success of vaccines in preventing infectious diseases, fears about
their safety and other anti-vaccination claims are widespread. To better understand how
such fears and claims persist and spread, we must understand how they are perceived and
recalled. One influence on the perception and recall of vaccination-related information might
be universal cognitive biases acting against vaccination. An omission bias describes the
tendency to perceive as worse, and recall better, bad outcomes resulting from commissions
(e.g. vaccine side effects) compared to the same bad outcomes resulting from omissions
(e.g. symptoms of vaccine preventable diseases). Another factor influencing the perception
and recall of vaccination-related information might be people’s attitudes towards vaccines.
A confirmation bias would mean that pre-existing pro-vaccination attitudes positively predict
perceptions of severity and recall of symptoms of vaccine preventable diseases and nega-
tively predict perceptions of severity and recall of vaccine side effects. To test for these
hypothesized biases, 202 female participants aged 18–60 (M = 38.15, SD = 10.37) com-
pleted an online experiment with a between-subjects experimental design. Participants
imagined that they had a 1-year old child who suffered from either vaccine side effects
(Commission Condition) or symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease (Omission Condi-
tion). They then rated a list of symptoms/side effects for their perceived severity on a 7-point
Likert scale. Finally, they completed a surprise recall test in which they recalled the symp-
toms/side effects previously rated. An additional scale was used to measure their attitudes
towards vaccines. Contrary to the hypotheses, perceptions of severity and the recall of
symptoms/side effects were not associated with experimental condition, failing to support
the omission bias, nor did they interact with attitudes towards vaccines, failing to support
the confirmation bias. This cast doubt on the possibility that the spread of anti-vaccination
claims can be explained by these particular universal cognitive biases.
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Introduction
Ever since vaccination was developed in the late 18th century, it has been accompanied by
scepticism and opposition. Early resistance to the first vaccine, against smallpox, was moti-
vated by fears towards a practice that conflicted with folk intuitions and religious beliefs [1–3].
Smallpox vaccination entailed the introduction of an alien substance into the human blood-
stream, which was seen as a violation of bodily purity and as the cause of, rather than the cure
for, diseases [3]. Moreover, the mechanism by which vaccination against smallpox worked was
counterintuitive as it implied that the intentional infection with one disease (cowpox) could
prevent the future development of a related but different disease (smallpox) [2]. Furthermore,
smallpox vaccination involved the mixture of a substance coming from a cow with human
blood, which was considered anti-natural and anti-Christian in Europe [2] and was also dis-
turbing for Hindus in colonial India [1].
More recently, specific vaccines (e.g. the MMR vaccine) have been the targets of opposition
and have often been falsely linked to idiopathic medical conditions such as autism, neurologi-
cal disorders and allergies [4–6]. Anti-vaccination messages recurrently emerge and spread
through the mass media [7, 8], social media [9] and on anti-vaccination websites [10–14]. This
spread of anti-vaccination messages affects people’s decisions regarding whether to vaccinate
or not [15, 16]. As a consequence of the erosion of herd immunity and the formation of clus-
ters of unvaccinated individuals [17], outbreaks of vaccine-preventable infectious diseases still
occur in developed countries, sometimes leading to fatal consequences.
The recurrence and potency of social fears about the safety of vaccines and the widespread
diffusion of anti-vaccination information, despite the spectacular contribution of vaccines in
preventing diseases, calls for a scientific explanation. Miton and Mercier [18] recently argued
that two characteristics of human cognition—disgust towards potential contaminants and an
omission bias—make vaccination counterintuitive. This counter-intuitiveness makes anti-vac-
cination messages “cognitively attractive” and likely to spread (see [19] for a general discussion
on how scientific and pseudoscientific ideas spread). In the present article we empirically test
the role of one of these cognitive factors, the omission bias, i.e. the tendency to consider bad
outcomes resulting from a commission (e.g. side effects of a vaccine) as worse that the same
bad outcomes resulting from an omission (e.g. symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease).
While there is some evidence for the existence of omission bias in the context of vaccination
(see next section), our study is novel in extending the scope of application of the omission
bias to perceptions of the severity of vaccine-related symptoms and side effects and their recall.
Consequently, we predict that people should rate as more severe, and retain better in memory,
vaccine side effects over symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease, where the symptoms and
the side effects are otherwise identical. These perceptual and memory effects relating to vac-
cine-related information (symptoms and side effects) would play a key role in the retention
and transmission of anti-vaccination messages and opinions. Our study is one of the first
experiments exploring the effects of cognitive biases in the recall of vaccine-related informa-
tion (see also [20, 21]).
1.1.- The omission bias in vaccine decisions
A substantial body of literature maintains that humans have a general tendency to consider the
bad outcomes resulting from an action (commission) as worse than the same bad outcomes
resulting from a lack of action (omission), even when the bad outcomes resulting from an
omission affect a greater number of people or have a higher probability of occurrence (e.g.
[22]). The basic paradigm for studying the omission bias applied to vaccine decisions was
developed by Ritov and Baron [23]. Participants are prompted to imagine a scenario in which
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an infectious disease kills 10 out of 10,000 non-vaccinated children but a new vaccine confers
immunity against this disease. However, the side effects of this vaccine can result in death with
a certain probability. Participants have to decide whether or not to vaccinate their child when
the probability of death by the vaccine side effects is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of 10,000
vaccinated children. The omission bias is detected when participants prefer not to vaccinate
when the probability of dying from vaccine side effects is lower than the probability of dying
from the vaccine-preventable infectious disease. Multiple experiments have found that many
people prefer not to vaccinate themselves or their children when the risks of suffering from a
vaccine-preventable disease are higher than the risks of suffering from a vaccine reaction,
where the severity of the disease and the vaccine reaction are equal [23–31]. Importantly, the
omission bias in hypothetical vaccine decisions positively predicts actual vaccine behaviour in
both retrospective [24, 26, 28] and prospective studies [31].
One of the cognitive mechanisms that might explain the omission bias is anticipated regret.
Some authors (e.g.[24]) have suggested that bad outcomes resulting from actions elicit consid-
erably more regret than the same bad outcomes resulting from a lack of action. The higher
level of regret after bad outcomes resulting from commissions is probably motivated by a
greater perception of the causality of commissions than of omissions [22]. This often makes
people judge commissions with negative consequences as morally wrong [22]. Nevertheless,
anticipated regret can also be experienced towards bad outcomes resulting from omissions
[32–35] and this might partly explain high vaccination rates in post-industrial societies.
From an evolutionary viewpoint, reliable estimations of the probabilities of risks were not
available during the greatest part of human history. Hence, it is plausible that natural selection
equipped humans with some cognitive biases (e.g. the omission bias) that, while technically or
statistically incorrect, maximised their bearers’ chances of survival and reproduction in ances-
tral environments. According to error management theory [36], cognitive biases evolved as a
result of the asymmetry between the costs of false positive and false negative errors in some
areas of human life in our evolutionary past. In this sense, the greater risks associated with
some actions (e.g. consuming an unknown toxic plant) in comparison with the lower risks
associated with inactions (e.g. avoiding consuming an unknown non-toxic plant) might have
prepared human psychology to consider bad outcomes resulting from commissions as worse
than those resulting from omissions. While this bias may have been an adaptive cognitive
short-cut in our ancestors, the persistence of this bias may be maladaptive in modern environ-
ments when people have access to reliable information that the asymmetry between false posi-
tives and false negatives does not occur.
1.2.- The omission bias in severity ratings
In the present study we build on previous work that has tested for omission bias in the context
of vaccination. While the research reviewed above has shown that omission bias may affect
people’s decisions about the acceptability of different risk probabilities, concerns have been
raised over the adequacy of the kind of probability judgements described above as used by
Ritov and Baron [23]. As Connolly and Reb [27] argue, such a method “requires the subject to
make complex tradeoffs of utility and probability” (p.189), amongst other problems. A more
realistic method, introduced by Connolly and Reb, is to ask participants to rate the severity of
symptoms caused by commissions and omissions. Here, the omission bias would occur when
people assess the same symptoms as more severe when they are the result of vaccine side effects
(commission) than when they are the result of symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease
(omission). Contrary to the operation of an omission bias, Connolly and Reb found that the
majority (60%) of participants in their study rated disease symptoms as equally serious as
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vaccine side-effects, with only 8% rating side-effects as more serious in line with omission bias.
However, the stated symptoms in that study were rather vague (e.g. “feeling horrible”) and
rated together rather than separately. A subsequent study by Brown, Kroll [37] allowed partici-
pants to assign specific symptoms to ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ and ‘severe’ diseases and vaccine reac-
tions. They found that for 9 out of 13 symptoms/reactions, more participants assigned the
symptom/reaction to a milder category when associated with a disease than to a vaccine side-
effect, which the authors interpreted as evidence for omission bias. Given this contradictory
evidence in the literature, our first aim here was to provide a further test of whether omission
bias affects severity ratings for vaccine-related symptoms and side-effects.
1.3- The omission bias in recall
Our second aim is to test whether omission bias also differentially affects memory for symp-
toms and side effects. If natural selection has provided human psychology with a tendency to
consider as worse the bad outcomes resulting from commissions than omissions, it is plausible
that natural selection would have also made people pay more attention to and recall better bad
outcomes resulting from commissions than bad outcomes resulting from omissions. If this is
true, vaccine side effects (commissions) should be better recalled than symptoms of a vaccine-
preventable infectious disease (omissions). This prediction relates to research on the adaptive
basis of memory and cultural transmission. Several studies have shown that adaptively-rele-
vant information, or information placed within an adaptive context, is better recalled and
transmitted along chains of participants than adaptively-neutral information, such as informa-
tion related to survival [38], social interactions [39, 40] and disgusting stimuli [41]. No previ-
ous research to our knowledge has tested the effects of omission bias on recall of vaccine-
related information, but this potentially plays a major role in the spread of vaccine (mis-)-
information in society.
1.4.- The confirmation bias
A final aim is to compare the omission bias against another potential bias relating to congruity
between presented information and pre-existing attitudes, known as confirmation bias. The
omission bias predicts that vaccine side effects are rated as more severe and are recalled better
than symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease in a manner that is relatively independent of
people’s attitudes towards vaccination. However, an alternative hypothesis is that people’s
assessments of severity and recall depend on their general attitudes towards vaccination. That
is, people with pro-vaccination attitudes would rate as more severe and recall better symptoms
of a vaccine-preventable disease than vaccine side effects, while people with anti-vaccination
attitudes would rate as more severe and recall better vaccine side effects than symptoms of a
vaccine-preventable disease. The confirmation bias follows from research showing that people
are more likely to attend to and recall information that supports or confirms their pre-existing
attitudes on issues such as gun control [42], as well as the larger literature on motivated reason-
ing and cognition [43]. As others have done for omission bias, Mercier and Sperber [43, 44]
suggest an evolutionary basis for confirmation bias: if the adaptive function of reasoning is to
act as a process of social argumentation, negotiation and persuasion, then selectively perceiv-
ing and recalling information that supports one’s position makes human communication
more effective and mutually advantageous. However, Altay and Mercier [21] did not find that
participants with pro-vaccination attitudes recall better perceived pro-vaccination messages
than perceived anti-vaccination information, failing to support the confirmation hypothesis
as applied to vaccination. Together with that study, our study is one of the first to test whether
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the confirmation bias plays a role in the transmission of vaccine-related information, and the
first to directly compare omission and confirmation biases.
1.5.- Hypotheses
We specify two pairs of hypotheses, one pair for the dependent measure ‘severity ratings’ and
another pair for the dependent measure ‘recall’.
Hypotheses about severity ratings:
• H1a (omission bias hypothesis): Vaccine side effects (commissions) will be assessed as more
severe than symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease (omissions), irrespective of people’s
vaccination attitudes.
• H1b (confirmation bias hypothesis): People with anti-vaccination attitudes will rate as more
severe the vaccine side effects (commissions), while people with pro-vaccination attitudes
would rate as more severe the symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease (omissions).
Hypotheses about recall:
• H2a (omission bias hypothesis): The bad outcomes resulting from vaccine side effects (com-
missions) will be better recalled than bad outcomes resulting from a vaccine-preventable dis-
ease (omissions).
• H2b (confirmation bias hypothesis) People with anti-vaccination attitudes will recall to a
greater extend vaccine side-effects (commissions), while people with pro-vaccination atti-
tudes will recall to a greater extent symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease (omissions).
Methods
2.1.- Ethical statement
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Department of Anthropology of Uni-
versity of Durham on 24th June 2016. Participants were informed of the procedure before the
experiment began. They were also informed that their participation was anonymous and confi-
dential and that they could withdraw from participating in the study at any time by simply
closing the browser without having to give any kind of explanation. After reading this, partici-
pants provided their consent to participate in the study and to use their anonymous responses
for scientific publications by ticking a box.
2.2.- Participants
Participants were recruited through Prolific (www.prolific.ac) following the procedure stated
in the preregistration, which can be found on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website
(https://osf.io/gebc7/). This procedure entailed using pre-screening filters to select participants
who had not previously participated in any of our vaccine-related experiments, had an approval
rate of 90% or above, were aged 18–60 years, spoke English as a first language and had British
or American nationality. These characteristics were assumed to increase the chances of collect-
ing responses provided by participants who understood the content of the information and
paid attention to the materials. In addition, participants were pre-screened by their gender and
attitudes towards vaccination. Chandler and Paolacci [45] have shown that participants can lie
by self-reporting rare conditions (e.g. having a child with autism) in order to get access to more
studies. As did they, we found that men showed a greater tendency to report rare conditions
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(anti-vaccination attitudes in our case) than women [45]. This threatens the validity of the pres-
ent study. Consequently, we decided to include only women in the experiment, as their pre-
screened anti-vaccination attitudes were more reliable than the ones reported by men. This
comes with the obvious cost that we can only make inferences about women’s ratings and
recall, and not men’s.
We selected 50% participants who self-reported pro-vaccination attitudes and 50% who
self-reported anti-vaccination attitudes. For pre-screening vaccination attitudes, participants
indicated their agreement with the following item on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7
(totally agree): “If I had a baby to care for, I would want him/her to get all the recommended
immunizations” [46]. Participants who agreed (ratings from 5 to 7) were considered to have
pro-vaccination attitudes and participants who disagreed (ratings from 1 to 3) were considered
to have anti-vaccination attitudes.
Consequently, we collected responses from 261 participants (260 female, 1 male) aged 18–
60 (M = 38.15, SD = 10.37) with American (N = 43), British (N = 216) or other nationality
(N = 2), being all but one English native speakers. After excluding participants who did not
meet the inclusion criteria of being (i) female, (ii) an English native speaker, (iii) aged 18–60
and (iv) reading the experimental manipulation at a pace greater than 400 words per minute
[47], the final sample comprised 202 female participants (38 American, 164 British) aged 18–
60 (M = 38.61, SD = 10.39). The data was collected on 5th March and 31st March 2018.
2.3.- Materials
The experiment was programmed and administered using Gorilla (www.gorilla.sc/about). A
list of 24 symptoms were used for obtaining measures of severity ratings, reaction times and
recall. All these symptoms were selected from a larger list of 54 symptoms. 58 participants (22
males, 36 females) aged 19–76 (M = 38.10, SD = 14.10) recruited through Crowdflower rated
each symptom for familiarity and severity on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (very unfamiliar/
mild) to 7 (very familiar/severe). All the symptoms selected for the experiment were highly
familiar (M> 4.5) and their severity had a large variability (SD> 1.3) for this independent
sample of participants (Table 1). See Supplementary Materials A and B in S1 File for further
details.
Two different texts were created as processing conditions. The texts were adapted from
Connolly and Reb [27] who themselves adapted the scenarios from Ritov and Baron [23] and
Asch, Baron [24]. The greatest part of the information was similar across the two texts. The
texts varied in only one aspect: one text prompted the participants to imagine that they had a
one-year-old child who suffered from a set of symptoms as a consequence of a vaccine-pre-
ventable infectious disease (Omission Condition), while the other text prompted the partici-
pants to imagine that the symptoms were the consequence of the vaccine side effects
(Commission Condition):
Table 1. List of symptoms/side effects using in the experiment.
LIST OF SYMPTOMS/SIDE EFFECTS
Symptoms selected for the
experiment
crying, shivering, chills, swelling, cough, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, headache,
earache, wheezing, abdominal pain, muscle ache, loss of appetite, soreness,
hoarseness, itchy eyes, toothache, light-headedness, dry mouth, weight gain,
anxiety, insomnia, bleeding.
Symptoms selected for the
practice
irritability, fever, rash, sneezing, dizziness
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.t001
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Imagine that, in the country in which you live, there have been several outbreaks of a new
infectious disease. The disease can cause severe illness to children under three. Only a small num-
ber of children exposed actually catch this disease, but for those who do it is often quite severe.
A vaccine for this disease has been developed and tested. The vaccine eliminates any possibility
of the vaccinated child getting the disease. The vaccine, however, can sometimes cause side effects
that are very similar to the symptoms of the disease. Fortunately, these unpleasant side effects are
rare. In fact, the risk of a vaccinated child getting the unpleasant side effects is about as low as the
chance of a non-vaccinated child getting the severe symptoms of the disease.
Imagine that you have one child, a one-year old. Suppose you decided to vaccinate [commis-
sion condition] / not to vaccinate [omission condition]. Unfortunately, your child is one of
those who suffer from the vaccine side effects [commission condition] / symptoms of the dis-
ease [omission condition].
An additional sample of 53 participants (28 males, 24 females and 1 other; 39 British and
14 Americans) aged 20–58 years (M = 36.26, SD = 11.11), who were recruited through Prolific,
rated these texts for their quality and their elicitation of different emotions (disgust, regret,
fear, anger, sadness, joy, compassion, surprise and confusion). These ratings did not differ
across the texts. See Supplementary Materials C and D in S1 File for further details.
Two items were included to measure attitudes towards vaccination (“If I had a baby to care
for, I would want him/her to get all the recommended immunizations” and “I believe that sched-
uled immunizations are safe for children”). These items were previously used by Browne, Thom-
son [46], who adapted the items themselves from Gust, Strine [48]. A 7-point Likert scale was
used to collect the participants’ responses (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree) on these three
items. The scores of the two items about vaccination attitudes were summed together, divided
by two and converted into a scale from -3 to +3. The internal consistency of the scale was high
(Cronbach’s α = 0.95).
2.4.- Design and procedure
A between-subjects design with two conditions (omission vs commission) was employed. After
providing consent participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions
and then the experiment began. The procedure was similar to the survival processing paradigm
[38]. First, participants were shown one of the two processing condition scenarios (i.e. pre-
pared texts). Then the participants were told that they would be shown a list of symptoms/side
effects that their child might have as a consequence of their decision to vaccinate/not to vacci-
nate. The task consisted of rating the severity of the 24 symptoms/side effects on a scale from 1
(very mild) to 7 (very severe). To give their answers, participants had to move the mouse on
the screen and click on a number (see https://gorilla.sc/openmaterials/58919).
Before the experiment started, they practiced the experimental procedure with a list of five
symptoms/side effects to ensure that the participants fully understood the task (Table 1). After
completing the practice, the participants had the opportunity to read the processing conditions
and instructions again. Then, they rated the severity of 24 symptoms/side effects. The symp-
toms/side effects appeared randomly at the center of the screen. The participants had up to
five seconds to rate the severity of each symptom/side effect. If participants responded before 5
seconds, the symptoms/side effect disappeared and the next trial started. Between trials a fixa-
tion point “+” appeared at the center of the screen for 500 milliseconds.
The next stage of the experiment entailed the completion of the distractor task that involved
solving easy sums (e.g. 2+3) for 2 minutes. Afterwards, the instructions for the surprise free
recall test appeared on the screen. The participants were prompted to recall the previously pre-
sented symptoms/side effects. Participants had 3 minutes to complete this task. A countdown
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timer appeared on the screen. When the countdown reached zero, the participants were auto-
matically redirected to the last phase of the experiment, in which they had to complete the
scale about attitudes towards vaccination and report their demographic data (gender, age,
nationality, native language, education and number of children).
Results
Statistical analyses were preregistered on the OSF website (https://osf.io/gebc7/). In the prereg-
istered protocol, we planned to test the confirmation bias hypothesis by conducting regression
models with interaction terms without main effect terms (e.g. Average Severity ~ Condition:
Vaccination Attitudes). However, the use of interaction terms without main effect terms is
controversial and, consequently, we conducted additional analyses including both interaction
and main effect terms (e.g. Average Severity ~ Condition � Vaccination Attitudes). Following
statistical advice, we report here these latter analyses. Nevertheless, this alternative procedure
did not qualitatively change the results (see Supplementary Material E in S1 File).
3.1.- Attitudes towards vaccination
Although participants were pre-screened to ensure a balanced distribution of pro-vaccination
and anti-vaccination attitudes, the sample was considerably skewed towards pro-vaccination
attitudes (M = 1.13, SD = 1.93). As expected, participants who reported pro-vaccination atti-
tudes in the pre-screening showed very positive attitudes towards vaccines in the experiment
(M = 2.52, SD = 0.74). In contrast, participants with anti-vaccination attitudes in the pre-
screening reported very variable attitudes towards vaccines ranging from -3 to +3 (M = -0.29,
SD = 1.85). Nevertheless, the distribution of participants’ attitudes towards vaccines was very
similar in both conditions (Commission: M = 1.14, SD = 1.99; Omission: M = 1.12, SD = 1.88).
See Fig 1.
3.2.- Average severity ratings
For our analyses of average severity ratings, we adopted a model comparison approach [49].
We first ran a null linear model that used a fixed intercept (i.e. the mean of the outcome vari-
able) to predict each participants’ average severity ratings. We compared this null model with
two linear regression models directly derived from our hypotheses using Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC, see Table 2). A lower AIC by a difference of two or larger was considered evi-
dence of better fit to the data.
The first model (AIC = 492.8) tested the omission bias hypothesis in severity ratings (H1a),
which predicted greater severity ratings in the commission than in the omission condition.
This model included condition as the sole predictor of average severity ratings. The second
model (AIC = 496.9) tested the confirmation bias hypothesis in severity ratings (H1b), which
predicted a positive relationship between vaccination attitudes and average severity ratings in
the omission condition and a negative relationship between these variables in the commission
condition. This model included attitudes towards vaccination, average severity ratings and
their interaction as predictors of average severity ratings. Contrary to H1a and H1b, none of
these models had a better fit than the intercept-only null model (AIC = 492.8) (see Fig 2).
Similarly, exploratory analyses of the effects of the demographic variables (i.e. nationality, age,
education, having children or not) and their interaction with the experimental condition and
participants’ attitudes towards vaccines did not improve the model fit compared to the null
model.
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3.3- Recall
For our analyses of recall, we use the same model comparison approach as for the analyses of
average severity ratings. As our outcome variable was the proportion of correctly recall symp-
toms/side effects, we model the relationship between the predictors and the outcome variables
using logistic regression models for a proportional outcome [50]. The fit of a null model was
compared with our confirmatory models (see Table 3). As for the ratings of severity, a lower
AIC by a difference of two or larger was considered evidence of better fit to the data. Correct
recall was assessed by comparing each of the symptoms/side effects listed by the participants
with the list of symptoms/side effects for the experiment. This comparison was semantic. For
instance, symptoms/side effects such as irritated eyes, sore throat and sickness were coded as
equivalent to itchy eyes, hoarseness and nausea respectively. Other symptoms/side effects
Fig 1. Frequencies of the different scores in the scale of vaccination attitudes split by condition from -3 (extremely anti-
vaccination) to + 3 (extremely pro-vaccination).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.g001
Table 2. Model Comparisons for confirmatory models to predict average severity ratings. ‘Condition’ specified whether the participant received the commission or the
omission scenario.
Models for Confirmatory Analyses AIC dAIC df weight Residual Deviance
Null 492.8 0 2 0.667 133
Condition 492.8 2 3 0.246 133
Condition X Vaccination Attitudes 496.9 4.1 5 0.087 131.7
‘Condition’ specified whether the participant received the commission or the omission scenario.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.t002
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which were not semantically similar to the symptoms/side effects presented to the participants
(e.g. fatigue, cold, nervousness) were ignored as errors.
First, three control models including average reaction time and average severity ratings
together and separately were produced to control the possible effects of these variables on
Fig 2. Average severity ratings across vaccination attitudes in both conditions (Omission and Commission). Left: Contrary to the omission bias
hypothesis (H1a), the average severity ratings were almost identical in the Omission and Commission Conditions. Right: Contrary to the confirmation
bias hypothesis (H1b), the severity ratings did not differ as a function of the interaction between condition and vaccination attitudes. The shaded area
represents 95% confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.g002
Table 3. Model comparisons for confirmatory models to predict correct recall. ‘Condition’ specified whether the participant received the commission or the omission
scenario.
Models for Confirmatory Analyses AIC dAIC df weight Residual Deviance
Null 1028.2 3.6 1 0.06 321.6
Reaction Time (Control Model) 1025.2 0.6 2 0.269 316.6
Condition 1029.4 4.8 2 0.033 320.8
Condition + Reaction Time 1025.9 1.2 3 0.192 315.3
Condition X Vaccination Attitudes 1027.4 2.8 4 0.090 314.8
Condition X Vaccination Attitudes + Reaction Time 1024.7 0 5 0.356 310.1
‘Condition’ specified whether the participant received the commission or the omission scenario.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.t003
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recall, and their model fit was compared to each other and to the null model. The model with
only average reaction time as a predictor (AIC = 1025.2) was the only model with a better fit
than the null model (AIC = 1028.2). As a consequence, this model was used as a base for the
confirmatory analyses.
To test the omission bias hypothesis in recall (H2a), which predicts a greater recall of vac-
cine side effects (commission condition) than symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease
(omission condition), two models were produced. The first model included only condition as
predictor of recall (AIC = 1029.4). The second model included additively both average reaction
time and condition as predictors (AIC = 1025.9). None of these models improved the model
fit of the control model that contained only average reaction time (AIC = 1025.2). To test the
confirmation bias hypothesis in recall (H2b), which predicts a positive relationship between
the proportion of symptoms/side effects correctly recalled and vaccination attitudes in the
omission condition and a negative relationship between these variables in the commission
condition, two models were produced. The first model included condition, vaccination atti-
tudes and their interaction as predictors of recall (AIC = 1027.4). The second model also
included average reaction time as a predictor (AIC = 1024.7). None of these models improved
the model fit of the control model (AIC = 1025.2). Therefore, we did not find support for H2a
or H2b. See Fig 3.
Exploratory analyses of the effects of the demographic variables (i.e. nationality, age, educa-
tion, having children or not) and their interaction with the experimental condition and partici-
pants’ attitudes towards vaccines were also conducted. Models with education as a predictor
improved the fit over the control model, the best model being the one that included the addi-
tive effect of average reaction time and education (AIC = 1011.8). In this model, both educa-
tion (β = 0.23, SE = 0.06) and average reaction times (β = 0.09, SE = 0.06) were positively
related to the proportion of symptoms/side effects correctly recalled. Neither of these effects
were predicted, nor do they relate to our hypothesised effects.
Discussion
We found no evidence to support the omission bias hypothesis in either severity ratings (H1a)
or recall (H2a) of vaccine-related symptoms and side-effects. The same physical conditions
were rated as equally severe and recalled equally well when described as disease symptoms and
as vaccine side-effects, contrary to our prediction that side-effects should be rated stronger and
recalled better. We also found no evidence for the confirmation bias in either severity ratings
(H1b) or recall (H2b). Participants’ stance on vaccination had no effect on their severity rat-
ings or recall of disease symptoms and vaccine side-effects, contrary to our prediction that
pro-vaccination participants would rate more severely and recall better disease symptoms than
vaccine side-effects, and anti-vaccination participants the reverse.
Our null finding with respect to omission bias contrasts with the many supportive studies
reviewed in the Introduction. However, as noted above, many of these studies may suffer from
methodological problems relating to the presentation of unintuitive probability information
[27]. Following Connolly and Reb [27], we used a more intuitive method focusing on concrete
physical symptoms and side effects rather than abstract and extreme probabilities of mortality.
Like Connolly and Reb, we found no evidence for omission bias despite better controlled and
more detailed presentation of symptoms and side effects. This counts against Brown et al. [37]
who purported to find omission bias in severity ratings of specific symptoms and side effects.
However, Brown et al.’s method is somewhat convoluted, with participants asked to create
mild, moderate and severe diseases and side effects. Their statistical analysis did not correct for
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running multiple t-tests; when we apply Holm-Bonferroni correction to their 13 comparisons
the number that are statistically significant reduced from 9 to just 6.
Like Connolly and Reb [27], then, we are sceptical of the existence of omission bias as
applied to vaccination, especially in light of the results of a recent study [20]. This study use a
different experimental procedure, the method of serial reproduction [51, 52], and similarly
found no support for the omission bias. Therefore, we recommend re-examination of prior
positive findings in the literature. In relation to evolutionary arguments for the adaptiveness of
omission bias, it is possible that the selection pressure in our evolutionary past required for the
evolution of the omission bias was not as strong as the selection pressure for the evolution of
other types of content transmission biases such as the tendency to recall and transmit better
social [39, 40, 53], emotional [41, 54, 55] and survival [38, 56, 57] information, all of which
have been demonstrated in modern human populations. The lack of evidence for the omission
bias might indicate the nonexistence of such a bias or the elimination of its effects in modern
environments. Another possibility is that our between-subjects experiment design with a sam-
ple size of 202 participants might have been inadequate to detect a small or medium effect of
omission bias. A replication of the current experiment with a larger sample size might help to
clarify this possibility.
Fig 3. Proportion of symptoms/side effects correctly recalled across vaccination attitudes in both conditions (Omission and Commission). Left:
Contrary to the omission bias hypothesis (H2a), the proportion of correct recall was similar in the Omission and Commission Conditions. Right:
Contrary to the confirmation bias hypothesis (H1b), the proportion of correct recall did not differ as a function of the interaction between condition
and vaccination attitudes. The shade area represent 95% confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228898.g003
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We also found no evidence to support the confirmation bias in either severity ratings or
recall. This might be due to participants assessing the severity of symptoms independently of
their causes. The lack of evidence for this hypothesis in recall is more difficult to explain.
Research on the relationship between attitudes and recall has found contradictory results, both
supporting and failing to support this hypothesis [58]. For instance, Frost et al. [42]found that
people were better at recognising information that is congruent with their previous beliefs. In
contrast, active resistance to arguments that are incongruent with previous beliefs has also
been shown to improve recall [59].
One limitation of our test of the confirmation bias was related to the need to recruit partici-
pants with pre-existing pro- and anti-vaccination attitudes. Problematically, there was a mis-
match between the attitudes towards vaccines self-reported in the pre-screening and the
attitudes reported in the experiment, with fewer participants reporting anti-vaccination atti-
tudes in the experiment than in the pre-screening. A possible explanation for this mismatch is
that some participants assumed that reporting anti-vaccination attitudes would ensure their
participation in a greater number of studies and, therefore, earn them more money [45]. Con-
sequently, the use of pre-screening questions on participant recruiting websites (e.g. Prolific,
Amazon Mechanical Turk) to collect responses from people with low frequency conditions
such as anti-vaccination attitudes might not be the best option for further research. Future
studies should create better procedures to recruit participants with anti-vaccination attitudes,
for instance, by directly recruiting from anti-vaccination groups.
Another limitation is that participants had to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which
their decision to vaccinate or not to vaccinate was randomly imposed by us. It is possible that
the results might have been different if participants had to choose whether to vaccinate or not
by themselves and later rate/recall the symptoms/side effects. Such a procedure may have
increased the participants’ investment in the task, providing more valid responses.
Conclusion
The lack of convincing evidence for the omission bias suggests that the spread of anti-vaccina-
tion messages might not be explained by an omission bias acting against the practice of vacci-
nation. Instead, the messages transmitted by people with anti-vaccination beliefs might spread
due to having particular characteristics (e.g. being simple, concrete, emotional, unexpected,
narrative, etc.) that make them especially “sticky” in human minds [60]. Importantly, the same
characteristics of these messages might also be used to promote vaccination [20, 61], providing
a more optimistic prospect for countering anti-vaccination information.
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